In this paper, I argue that Brad Hooker's rule-consequentialism implausibly implies that what earthlings are morally required to sacrifice for the sake of helping their less fortunate brethren depends on whether or not other people exist on some distant planet even when these others would be too far away for earthlings to affect.
effect on their thoughts or experiences, as their planet is billions of light years away from ours and, consequently, far beyond the reach of our causal powers. We know about them only through the supernatural abilities of an oracle, who we know always tells the truth and who tells us everything about them.
2 But although we know about them, they do not know about us, for we have no way to communicate with them, let alone affect their welfares. Given that we can have no effect on their lives and that they can have no effect on our lives beyond whatever little effect our knowledge of their doings has on us, how could their existence possibly affect how much one of us is required to sacrifice for the sake of alleviating some of the suffering here on Earth? It seems absurd to suppose that it
could. Yet this is precisely what rule-consequentialism, as recently developed and defended by Brad Hooker, implies.
3 On Hooker's formulation of rule-consequentialism, an 'act is wrong if and only if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each new generation has maximum expected value in terms of well-being (with some priority for the worst off)'. 4 Since, on Hooker's view, well-being and the fairness of its distribution are the only two values, this formulation is equivalent to saying that we are morally required to act in accordance with the code of rules whose internalization by the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each new generation has maximum total expected value. 5 This is the ideal code. The total expected value (or 'TEV' for short) of a code is a function of two things: (1) the expected value it would have were it internalized by the overwhelming majority of everyone 3 everywhere in each new generation (call this the 'post-internalization value' or 'PIV' for short) and (2) the expected costs of getting that code internalized by the overwhelming majority of everyone everywhere in each new generation (call these the 'internalization costs' or 'IC' for short). And one counts as having internalized a code of rules if and only if one 'has a disposition to comply with them, dispositions to feel guilt when one breaks them and to resent others' breaking them, and a belief that the rules and these dispositions are justified'.
6
To see how, on rule-consequentialism, the extent to which we are morally required to make self-sacrifices for the sake of aiding our fellow earthlings in great need can depend on whether zargonians exist, compare the following two The idea of relativizing codes to groups is on the road to relativizing them to sub-groups, and at the end of that road is relativizing them to individuals. To go down that road is to turn our backs on one of the traditional attractions of rule-consequentialism-viz., its basis in the idea that morality should be thought of as a collective, shared code. 15 It appears, then, that the only way to revise rule-consequentialism so as to avoid the sorts of counterintuitive implications that I've been discussing is to modify it so that it relativizes codes to individuals, and this comes at the price of turning our backs on the very foundational idea underlying rule-consequentialism.
It is also unclear whether relativizing codes to individuals would even succeed in avoiding counterintuitive implications. Even if we change the example so that zargonians to dramatically reduce their costs with respect to getting more complex and demanding codes internalized is not a new development, but rather a development that occurred long ago.
Also, to ensure that no other code besides Code M or Code E will be in contention for being the ideal code, let's assume that, for some unknown reason, all microchips preprogrammed with codes other than either Code M or Code E have failed to interface properly with the human/zargonian brain.
